Power sharing hinges on cooperation between communal parties who are expected to mobilise citizens in support of the new political system. Yet, women are often illserved and their political differences exacerbated by such arrangements. Mindful of this finding and using data from the 2015 Northern Ireland Election Survey, we examine differences in party attachment between Catholic and Protestant women. The results suggest that Catholic women are more likely to claim a party attachment than Protestant women and a key factor in accounting for this phenomenon is differences in their levels of endorsement and perceived effectiveness of the two main political parties.
Introduction
International peace negotiators, academics and policymakers increasingly accept that the design and implementation of political arrangements involving the main antagonists to the conflict is the most viable approach to resolving inter-communal division in societies emerging from deep-seated ethnic conflict. Internal power-sharing arrangements among political elites along communal lines has become the dominant approach to resolving inter-communal strife in post-conflict societies. In principle, this form of government, otherwise known as the consociational approach 1 is seen as enabling communities that have conflicting identities based on ethnic differences to ameliorate and eventually remedy these long-standing patterns of division and to coexist in a politically stable, peaceful and inclusive society. By recognising the salience of ethnic divisions and by providing groups access to power on a proportional basis, supporters of consociationalism argue that not only will communal elites be incentivised to cooperate but also to bring their constituents with them in a spirit of accommodation and compromise. 2 Political parties are central to this process. For effective and stable power sharing, communal parties must cooperate with one another and encourage their constituents to support the political system. In doing so, not only do political parties help legitimate the new political arrangements but they also promote peaceful inter-communal relations. 3 The importance of political parties in deeply divided societies to resolving conflict is further underpinned by the ethnic party system. 4 In such societies, not only do political parties remain highly segregated along ethnic lines but ethnic outbiddingwhereby parties within the same ethnonational bloc seek to portray themselves as the true defenders of their own ethnic group -accompanied by ethnic tribal voting is often the primary, if not sole, mechanism for party competition. 5 In fact, more so than any other factor, it is this issue, or the ability of such parties to act as ethnic tribunes under well-designed power sharing, that advocates of consociationalism suggest allows formerly hard-line ethnic parties to moderate their political stance and adopt a more conciliatory approach to issues beyond the ethnonational question. As Mitchell et al put it: 'With appropriate power-sharing institutions ethnic parties derive electoral rewards by competing on more moderate platforms, providing that they reinforce an "ethnic tribune appeal", i.e. the perception that they most effectively represent their groups' ethnonational interests.' 6 Not all political analysts, however, share this view. Some scholars point to the negative effects of the consociational model, notably its tendency to freeze communal division and political representation along ethnonational lines. Moreover, as the electoral success of parties in this instances are dependent on exclusive appeals to ethnic loyalties rather than on issues of class or ideology, the representation of the interests of citizens outside these forms of allegiances, including the political rights of women, are either ignored or considered secondary to the ethnonational question at best. 7 Feminist scholars, in particular, have been highly critical of consociational power sharing, pointing not only to the systematic marginalisation of women and their collective interests but also to the reproduction of patriarchal privilege in consociational institutions and their power-sharing practices. 8 Even feminist scholars who are less critical of such power sharing acknowledge that women and their interests are ill-served by such political arrangements. As Byrne and McCulloch put it: '[While] there is nothing inherent in power-sharing that cannot be made more democratic and inclusive of women….the failure to theorise gender and recognize gender power relations means that women remain invisible in the literature's prescription for conflict resolution and in power-sharing practices. 9 It is with these various findings in mind that this study focuses on differences in party attachment among women. Despite the importance of political parties for the stability of power-sharing arrangements as well as their suggested marginalisation of the collective interests of women in societies emerging from conflict, to date, the position of women in relation to party attachment has received little scholarly attachment. This is particularly the case when differences in the degree of attachment among women to ethnic parties is considered. 10 The absence of such research must be considered surprising for the following two reasons.
First, it is increasingly recognised that the political contribution of women is vital for the successful and peaceful transition of societies emerging from conflict. A view it should be noted that has been repeatedly endorsed by the United Nations Security Council in a series of resolutions on Women and Peace and Security. 11 Second, as proponents of intersectionality correctly point out, women do not form a politically monolithic group. Previous research has shown that not only are women divided by the range of factors -such as class, age, race and religion -in terms of their electoral turnout and party preferences in established democracies, 12 but this is also the case in many post-conflict societies where women are often sharply differentiated both by long-standing ethnic or religious loyalties as well as unequal access to resources. 13 It is with this specific finding in mind -intersectionality or long-standing political divisions among women -that this investigation focuses on differences between Protestant and Catholic women in terms of their party attachments. The article proceeds in two stages.
First, it outlines the relationship between the 1998 Agreement and the nature of party representation and support for the political advancement of women in Northern Ireland.
Building on this analytical discussion and using nationally representative data from the 2015 Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 14 it then examines religious differences in party attachment among women. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that this greater party attachment among
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Catholic women is a relatively recent phenomenon, which has fluctuated somewhat since the turn of the century.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
As the data in Table 2 demonstrates, while party attachment was higher among [Insert Table 2 about here]
Religious Differences in Party Support
There are a number of possible explanations as to why party attachment is now lower among Protestant women compared to their Catholic counterparts, the most obvious being their greater antipathy towards the two main political parties, particularly in terms of their perceived effectiveness in representing the interests of their own community. As noted earlier, it is this factor -judgements concerning the effectiveness of both the DUP and SF in standing up for their ethnic community -which supporters of the ethnic tribune thesis suggest accounts for their dramatic success at the ballot box since the turn of the century. To what extent is this also the case when party attachment among women is considered? Are there religious differences between women in relation to this issue?
The results in Table 3 [Insert Table 3 There is also some evidence to suggest that this perceived lack of effectiveness of the DUP, particularly among Protestant women, has remained relatively stable over time. As the data in Table 4 [Insert Table 4 about This is particularly the case when the effectiveness of parties is considered. At just 52 per cent, not only do a bare majority of Protestant women endorse the DUP as the most effective party to 'stand up' for unionism but there is also evidence to suggest that this lack of endorsement has remained relatively stable overtime.
The Net Effect of Religion and Party Support on Party Attachment
To what extent can these differing levels in party support account for the religious differences in party attachment among women? In other words, is it differences in their support for the two main political parties, both in terms of their level of personal endorsement and judgements concerning their effectiveness, which accounts for the lesser levels of party attachment among Protestant women? To address this question, Table 5 The results support our hypothesis that it is differences in support for the two main political parties -DUP and SF -that accounts for the religious gap in partisanship among women. As the data in Table 5 shows, although religion has an independent and statistical significant effect on party attachment (Model 1), an effect that remains when a range of control variables, such as socio-economic background and national identity, are included in the regression equation (Model 2), this statistical difference no longer holds when party support is added to the investigation (Model 3).
[Insert Table 5 
Electoral Outcomes
A key element in accounting for the electoral success of both the DUP and SF is perceptions concerning their effectiveness in representing the interests of their own community. More so than any other issue, it is this factor -judgements concerning their effectiveness in standing up for their own ethnic communities -which supporters of the ethnic tribune thesis suggest accounts for their ascendancy at the ballot box. To what extent is this also the case when electoral support among women is considered?
Detailed analysis is difficult because of the relatively small numbers of survey respondents involved, but the results suggest that not only was electoral turnout much higher among effective female voters -those who endorsed the DUP or SF as the most effective voice for their respective community -but they were also overwhelming more likely to cast their vote for the main party within their own ethnonational bloc.
As the data in Table 6 shows, while two-thirds of Protestant women who judged the DUP to be the most effective party to represent their community turned out to vote, the vast majority of them -83 per cent -also voted for the DUP as their preferred party of choice. By contrast, among non-effective female Protestant voters -those who did not endorse the DUP as the most effective voice for unionism -electoral turnout was not only markedly lower -44 per cent -but their preferred party of choice was the UUP.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
An identical pattern emerges when the link between party effectiveness and electoral behaviour within the female Catholic community is considered. As the data in Table 6 
